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Abstract 
This paper unfolds litigation opportunities for LGBT plaintiffs embedded in EU law. It explores both 
established tracks and future prospects for fostering the EU’s (at times half-hearted) goodbye to 
heteronormativity. The paper demonstrates how American federalism theories can pave the way for 
the “right to love” in the European Union, whose mobile sexual citizens are equally benefiting from 
the “leave” and “entry options”, requiring more heteronormative states to comply with the approaches 
to sexuality adopted by their more tolerant peers. The relevance of this normative framework based on 
federal “entry options” for the EU is further exemplified by a recent judgment of the US Supreme 
Court in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). The strategy of activating EU law in litigation for mobile 
couples could in the medium- to short-term perspective spill over the recognition of various forms of 
legal unions for gay and lesbian couples all over the Union, promoting tolerance, equality and respect. 
The paper reveals that Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC and actio popularis at the national level offer 
two major federal keys for activating this anticipated sexual emancipation via EU law. 
Keywords 
LGBT rights, EU law, non-discrimination, federalism, freedom of intimate association, sexual 
citizenship
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Uladzislau Belavusau∗ and Dimitry Kochenov∗∗ 
Introduction 
EU citizenship is not only a unique space for ‘overcoming’ nationality often imagined in terms of the 
dominant ethnicity of Member States.1 EU citizenship equally offers an activist arena for challenging 
sexual identities and inequalities embedded in those national citizenships, transnationalising discourse 
on rights and gay emancipation in Central and Eastern Europe as a matter of EU law. European, in this 
context, becomes a language of rights and entitlements, which can be turned, inter alia, against their 
own states of nationality. On the one hand, transnational forms of citizenship facilitate the very 
dialogue on sexual rights among Member States and problematise the construction of fixed identities.2 
On the other hand, EU citizenship is equally a realm of disciplining humiliation of the Member 
States.3 The rhetoric of ‘socially unfruitful’ homosexuality and the prescription of women’s 
reproductive role have been particularly visible in nationalist projects with ethno-centric views on the 
group boundaries and longevity.4 The Union instead offers value models for anti-discrimination 
developments beyond the ‘population’ narrative of – largely patriarchal and heteronormative – 
national citizenships. Although not always legally enforceable due to the limited possibilities for 
harmonisation and Union action, transnational and national LGBT movements can capitalise on value 
models as a matter of EU federalism for lobbying just causes.  
This contribution will highlight the progress of “gay rights” litigation before the Court of Justice, from 
the early 1990s. It will show how quasi-federal elements embedded in the ever-evolving EU law,5 on 
the one hand, created mobilizing opportunities for transnational LGBT litigation and, on the other 
hand, have steadily Europeanized the discourse on gay rights as part and parcel of the Union values.6 
Citizenship, anti-discrimination and fundamental rights’ developments have all contributed to the 
minimum “European” standards of LGBT rights’ protection. 
To these ends we first revisit the potential of LGBT rights in EU law through the looking glass of the 
normative discussion about Kreimer’s vision of federalism7 and Karst’s analysis of the “freedom of 
                                                       
∗ Assistant Professor, University of Amsterdam; Postdoctoral Fellow for the research platform ACCESS-Europe; Visiting 
Professor at the LUISS Guido Carli University (Rome).  
∗∗ Martin and Kathleen Crane Fellow in Law and Public Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (2015-2016); 
Professor of EU Constitutional Law, University of Groningen; Visiting Professor, College of Europe (Natolin campus). 
A much shortened version of the argument presented here is due to appear in K. Slootmaeckers et al. (eds.), The EU 
Enlargement and Gay Politics: The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Rights, Activism and Prejudice (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2016). 
1 D. Kochenov, ‘Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of Member States’ Nationalities Under Pressure from EU 
Citizenship’, EUI RSCAS Paper 23 (2010). 
2 U. Belavusau, ‘EU Sexual Citizenship: Sex Beyond the Internal Market’, in D Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and 
Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2016, forthcoming). Also available as EUI Working Paper 6 (2015). 
3 G. Davies, ‘The Humiliation of the State as a Constitutional Tactic’, in F. Amtenbrink and P. A. J. van den Bergh (eds.), 
The Constitutional Integrity of the European Union (The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2010).  
4 N. Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nations (London: Sage Publications, 1997).   
5 R Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism (Oxford: OUP, 2009); O. Beaud, Théorie de la fédération (PUF, 2007).  
6 See also D Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens and Moral Choices of States: Gays and European Federalism’, Fordham 
International Law Journal, 33, 1, 2009. 256-205 (a part of this paper is based on the argument substantially developed in 
this earlier article). 
7 S. F. Kreimer, ‘Federalism and Freedom’, 574 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 66 (2001), 
72-73.  
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intimate association”:8 the basic idea that any authority should be as cautious as possible in regulating 
human intimacy and love. The ultimate question is whether we face the nascent “right to love”9 
translated into the less-fortunate (with a due simplification: intolerant, homophobic, archaic) Member 
States via the federalizing impact of EU law. While the presence of an exit option is indisputably 
inherent in the nature of virtually any federal system, the legal specificity of the supranational Union 
in Europe with its goal-oriented reading of competences and the growing awareness of possible 
implications of its actions for human rights protection potentially opens a way also to an "entry 
option" that would oblige member states to recognize less restrictive or simply different moral choices 
made by other states. Outside of ideologically charged areas of sexuality, gender identity, and family 
law, such an "entry option" is already a day-to-day reality in the EU: Europeans can thus bring their 
own law with them, as they move from one Member State to another. 
The second part will outline the genesis and evolution of LGBT rights in Europe: from stringent 
boundaries of sex discrimination to free movement of sex couples via EU citizenship regime. The part 
will highlight two major periods in the history of LGBT litigation at the Court of Justice: before 
Amsterdam Treaty, when sexual minorities explored the limits of sex equality clause and after 
introduction of the special anti-discrimination provision into the Treaty, which is now Article 19 
TFEU.  
The third part will consequently unpack the necessity and the ways to capitalize on that EU values-
discourse along with novel anti-discrimination developments for the emancipation of LGBT rights, 
especially in the context of the Eastward enlargement. It will highlight the most recent case law of the 
Court of Justice as supplying a box of litigation opportunities for LGBT movements. That box (albeit 
not infinite and yet imperfect) is apparently available even in Central and Eastern European parts of 
the Union where coming-outs remain relatively uncommon and public life is often infected with social 
homophobia and intolerance.10 
Federal outlook on gay rights in the USA and the EU 
Federalism contributes to freedom at least in two ways: by providing a minimal rights denominator at 
the federal level which is to be followed by all the states and—in the issues where such denominator is 
either not available, or not sufficient—by providing an exit option for those who are unhappy in their 
native state. 
The Council of Europe can be viewed in this context as the provider of the most general common 
denominator of rights available in Europe, while the European Union is the guarantor of the exit 
option, which it granted to its citizens.11 Wherever you move in the EU, you are always covered by 
important CoE rules,12 including, especially, the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”)13 
                                                       
8 K. L. Karst, ‘The Freedom of Intimate Association’, 89 Yale Law Journal 624 (1980), at 624–25. 
9 The right to love is a catchy metaphor along with freedom of intimate association, borrowed from K. L. Karst, ‘The 
Freedom of Intimate Association’ 89 Yale Law Journal 624 (1980). 
10 See EU LGBT Survey: Poll on Homophobia Sparks Concern, BBC News, 17 May 2013, available at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22563843; L Turcescu & L Stan, ‘Religion, Politics and Sexuality in Romania’, 
57 Europe-Asia Studies 291 (2005), 292–298. For other examples in CEE context, see D. Kochenov, ‘Gay Rights in the 
EU: A Long Way Forward for the Union of 27’, Croatian Yearbook of European Law & Policy, 3 (2007).  
11 Arts 20 and 21 TFEU. 
12 All EU Member States are also Members of the Council of Europe. Art. 6 TEU stipulates that the Union is bound by 
fundamental rights as reflected in the European Convention of Human Rights and undertakes to accede this Convention. 
This creates a unique symbiosis of the two organizations: EU and CoE.  
13 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
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as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.14 All in all, however, the exit option becomes 
the most important one in terms of empowering European citizens, since the EU, by its very nature, is 
not empowered to act in the majority of fields,15 and given that rules of the Council of Europe are just 
as basic as they are important. 
It is clear that when a federal system is integrated to such an extent that the local differences are 
negligible, the ability of such a system to enhance liberty is likely to be negligible too. Indeed, 
“removing borders loses much of its value if what is on the other side is the same.”16 This point can 
also be proven with a simple use of numbers: 
For example, assume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 each.  Assume 
further that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish to outlaw smoking in public 
buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a national basis by a majority rule, 110 
people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If majorities in each state make a separate decision, 130 will 
be pleased and only 70 displeased.  The level of satisfaction will be still greater if the smokers in State 
A decide to move to State B, and some anti-smokers in State B decide to move to State A.17 
Thus when the political or legal regimes across an internal border differ, federalism turns into an asset 
for the promotion of liberty. Such liberty is not an apodictic ideal of the totalitarian states, but is rooted 
in the tandem of diversity and mobility. Extreme interpretations of this facet of federalism give the 
exit option more importance than political participation: “a sufficiently decentralized regime with full 
mobility could perfectly satisfy each person’s preferences even with no voting at all.”18 Practically, 
individual freedoms of citizens moving freely are potentially amplified since “state-by state variation 
leaves open the possibility to each individual of choosing to avoid repression by leaving the repressive 
jurisdiction.”19 This is an effective way to deal with what Madison saw as the greatest potential threat 
to individual liberty, i.e., the tyranny of the majority.20 Although not a panacea, the exit option 
provided by federalism should not be underestimated. 
The ability of the EU to advance liberty through federalism is extremely rich, as the Member States 
vary greatly. Only a marginal part of legal regulation has been harmonised, allowing citizens to benefit 
from the existing variations from one Member State to another. These variations are particularly 
important with regard to the positions the Member States take on the moral issues, such as abortion, 
same-sex marriage, divorce, and the like. The citizens thus have infinitely more possibilities to choose 
the legal regime that suits them best by moving from one Member State to another, compared with 
unified systems, where by moving one can find little more than a change in weather.  The situation of 
EU citizens thus approaches that of their U.S. counterparts. “Today, the lesbian who finds herself in 
Utah, like the gun lover who lives in Washington, D.C., and the gambler in Pennsylvania, need only 
cross the state border to be free of constraining rules.”21   
                                                       
14 For an overview of numerous cases on gay rights at the Court in Strasbourg, see P. Johnson, Homosexuality and the 
European Court of Human Rights (London: Routledge, 2014). About the implications of Strasbourg judgements for 
sexual emancipation in Europe, see L.R. Heffer & E. Voeten, ‘International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence 
from LGBTQ Persons in Europe’ (2014) 68 International Organizations 77. 
15 According to Art. 5 TEU, the EU can only act “within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties.  
16 G.T. Davies, ‘A Time to Mourn – How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Quite Like the European Union’, Inaugural 
Lecture (Amsterdam: VU, 2008), at 18.  
17 M. McConnel, ‘Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 University of Chicago Law Review 1484 (1987), 1494. 
18 Id. at 1494 n. 37. 
19 Kreimer, supra n. 7, at 71. 
20 See The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison) (introducing the concept of “tyranny of the majority”). 
21 Kreimer, supra n. 7, at 72. 
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The inter-state situation activated by cause lawyers before the U.S. Supreme Court is, to a vast degree, 
emblematic for EU law as well.22 Although widely streamlined in media as the judgment about same 
sex marriages, de jure the decision is more about recognition of rights derived from marriage than 
status, which ironically makes the recognition of status all over the American states only a matter of 
time. The case was launched after a same sex couple, James Obergefell and John Arthur married in 
Maryland. Their state of residence though – Ohio – did not recognize their marriage license, which 
enabled them to file a lawsuit about discrimination. John Arthur was terminally ill and suffering from 
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. For this reason, they wanted the other partner, James Obergefell, to be 
identified as his surviving spouse on his death certificate based on their Marriage in Maryland. 
Through this paradigm of rights based on the free movement between the states, the Supreme Court 
delivered a truly landmark judgment establishing that a fundamental right to marry is apparently 
guaranteed to same-sex couples by the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States.  
Besides an assumption that the states are self-governing and that there are important differences 
between them in terms of regulation of some issues of potential moral disagreement, in order to 
provide citizens with an “exit option” able to have far-reaching effects on their freedom, three features 
of the federal system that would limit the states themselves are absolutely crucial. Agreeing with 
Kreimer, these should include the free movement right granted to citizens, equality between 
newcomers and native citizens in the new state of residence, and territorially-limited state 
jurisdictions.23 Only when all the three elements are in place is it possible to talk about the exit option 
within the federal systems that would provide an opportunity to safeguard liberty for the citizens. All 
the three are now to be found in the EU. 
EU citizenship is a ius tractum status building on the nationalities of the Member States,24 which is at 
the same time ‘autonomous’25 and grounded in EU law, bringing with it a set of rights specific to the 
EU legal order.26  The most important of these have traditionally been considered non-discrimination 
on the basis of nationality27 – in the words of Davies, de facto “abolishing” the nationalities of the 
Member States28 – and free movement in the territory of the Union.29 The latter does not only include 
a right to travel around the EU, but also a right to settle anywhere you like with your family, take up 
employment and to be treated exactly the same way as the natives of your new Member State of 
residence are treated.30 Changing the Member State and non-discrimination on the basis of nationality 
are thus the core rights of EU citizenship stemming from the supranational legal order. Additionally, 
the Member States are prohibited from creating obstacles to free movement of citizens that would 
                                                       
22 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US_(2015). 
23 Kreimer, supra n. 7 , at 73. 
24 D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship Between Status and 
Rights’, 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 169 (2009), at 181. 
25 AG Maduro in C-135/08 Rottmann [2010], para 5.  
26 D. Kochenov & R. Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance: The Discovery of the 
Treaty Text’, 37 European Law Review 369 (2012). 
27 Art. 18 TFEU. See generally G.T. Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market (Kluwer, 2003) 
[highlighting the relationship between the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality and the right to free 
movement]; Astrid Epiney, ‘The Scope of Article 12 EC: Some Remarks on the Influence of European Citizenship’, 13 
European Law Journal 611, 612 n.4 (2007); P. Boeles, ‘Europese burgers en derdelanders: wat betekent het verbod van 
discriminatie naar nationaliteit sinds Amsterdam?’ 12 Sociaal-economische wetgeving 512 (2005). 
28 G.T. Davies, ‘“Any Place I Hang My Hat?” or: Residence Is the New Nationality’, 11 European Law Journal 43 (2005), 
55.  
29 Art. 21 TFEU. 
30 See Council Directive No. 2004/38, Art. 24, O.J. L 158/77, at 112 (2004). 
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discourage their own nationals to move to other Member States.31 Besides, the Member States cannot 
undermine the status of EU citizenship,32 or deprive citizens of the possibility to enjoy the ‘substance 
of rights’33 stemming from this status,34 including unwritten rights.35 
The first two of Kreimer’s components of federalism necessary to enable effective exit option are thus 
in place.  The third is part of the EU system too: the Member States are sovereign states also under 
international law, so their jurisdiction is most often limited to their own territory.36 Applied to the 
situation of the gay communities in the Member States the “exit option” of European federalism 
already provides a viable alternative to life in potentially less gay-friendly societies, such as Poland, 
Greece, or Slovakia, as moving to the Netherlands or Sweden is a protected EU citizenship right. 
Having said all this, it is as clear as day that “the exit option is no panacea”:37 the majority of people 
will only consider moving in exceptionally harsh circumstances. Simultaneously, a guarantee of a 
viable degree of legal unity of the Union is an indispensable consideration. Member States cannot 
specialize in accepting only citizens adhering to certain ideologies and rules of morality. Should this 
be the case, it would unquestionably result in the denial of the very idea of the Union, leading to its 
legal fragmentation.38 Above all, moving between cultures, from one society to another, is difficult. In 
the EU, where citizenship rights are unquestionably connected with the personal and financial 
situation of the citizen concerned,39 not merely the status of citizenship, it can even be impossible in 
some cases.40 
Given that the “exit option” is unable to solve all the problems and is even not always available in 
practice, a certain degree of legal convergence with regard to the most important issues, particularly 
related to human rights, is needed. Such convergence can theoretically come in three ways: via full 
harmonization, via partial supranational alignment, i.e. through terminology to be applied within the 
                                                       
31 See F.G. Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union – A Legal Analysis’, 13 European Law Journal 591 (2007), at 596–
98. 
32 Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010]; See also the annotation of the case in, D. Kochenov, ‘Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. 
Freistaat Bayern, Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 2 March 2010’, 47 Common Market Law Review 1831 
(2010). 
33 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011; for the annotation of the case, see M. van den Brink in D. Kochenov (ed.), EU 
Citizenship and Federalism: The Role of Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2016 – forthcoming).   
34 D. Kochenov, ‘A Real European Citizenship’, 18 Columbia Journal of European Law 56 (2011); S. Iglesias Sánchez, ‘El 
asunto Ruiz Zambrano: una nueva aproximación del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a la ciudadanía de la 
Unión’, 24 Revista General  de Derecho Europeo 1 (2011).  
35 D. Kochenov, ‘The Right to Have What Rights? EU Citizenship in Need of Clarification’, 19 European Law Journal 502 
(2013).  
36 There exist examples to the contrary, which are not easily accepted by the member states. See, e.g., M. Fichera, ‘The 
European Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convenience?’, 15 European Law Journal 70 (2009); J. 
Scott, ‘The New EU “Extraterritoriality”’, 51 Common Market Law Review 1343 (2014). 
37  S. F. Kreimer, ‘Federalism and Freedom’, 574 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 66 
(2001), at 72. 
38 This loosely compares to the U.S. principle that the states are not free to choose their citizens. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 
510–11 (1999) (“The States, however, do not have any right to select their citizens.”). In a sense, the same does not apply 
to the instances when the Member States apply EU and their own law in admitting new immigrants, which also affects 
third country nationals residing in the EU: the Union as a single working-living space does not exist for them: D. 
Kochenov & M. van den Brink, ‘Pretending There Is No Union: Non-Derivative Quasi-Citizenship Rights of Third-
Country Nationals in the EU’, 5 EUI Law Working Paper Law (2015).  
39 See, e.g., D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship Between Status 
and Rights’, 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 169 (2009), at 234–37 (listing factors determining European citizen 
benefits). 
40 D. Schiek, ‘Perspectives on Social Citizenship in the EU’ in D. Kochenov (ed) EU Citizenship and Federalism: The Role 
of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
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material scope of Union law, or via the federal requirement of recognition of national rules even 
outside the member states in which such rules were initially adopted:41 the crucial pillars of EU law. In 
all these cases, deviations from the rules are to be strictly checked against the principles of EU law.   
Yet another way stems directly from the availability of the pan-European human rights minimum 
introduced by the CoE, reinforcing the overall framework of human rights protection. In this regard, it 
is remarkable albeit completely unexpected that the European Court of Human Rights has most 
recently followed the logic of the U.S. Supreme Court in the settings of the Council of Europe, that is 
– unlike the EU which is the “exclusive club” of liberal democracies – hosting countries as different as 
Iceland and Azerbaijan. In its judgment in case Oliary & Others v. Italy (2015), the Court all of a 
sudden established that Italy should offer some form of registered partnership or marriage to gay 
couples.42  
It is remarkable that in this case the judgment refers to comparative jurisprudence, giving example of 
the U.S. Supreme Court that precedes Strasbourg just by a couple of weeks.43 This judgment also 
captures the growing consensus in the Member States, noting that 11 countries of the Council of 
Europe recognize same sex marriages, while 18 offer recognition of various forms of same sex 
partnerships.44 In this situation, the Italian Senate had to recognize same sex civil unions in February 
2016.45  
While harmonization is always an option, notwithstanding the fact that applying this tool in a number 
of fields would imply a Treaty change, mutual recognition enforced by EU institutions – one of the 
most successfully deployed ways of developing integration – can be more attractive in the European 
legal setting. This is particularly true in the areas dealing with the issues of deep moral disagreement 
between the Member States.  Consequently, the Treaties currently in force need to be optimally used 
in order to bring about change without full harmonization. This can be done using two avenues already 
mentioned: either via the formulation of European legal notions for some ambiguous terms to be used 
within the scope ratione materiae of Union law (i.e. “family),”46 or through the formulation of the 
principle of unconditional recognition of the national understanding of such terms even outside the 
borders of the Member States where they were formulated. The second could be preferable, since it 
implies full respect of the national-level solutions and does not require the ECJ to ‘legislate’. 
Moreover, it is unquestionably in line with the mutual recognition approach.47  
This being said, the ECJ is clearly in the position to choose either way. Consequently, the EU legal 
system is likely to offer more than a simple “exit option”, but also what can be characterized as an 
“entry option”, i.e., a legal possibility to enter a member state other than your own and carry the rules 
of your old member state with you.  The “entry option” thus constitutes a clear deviation from 
                                                       
41 M. Poiares Maduro, ‘So Close and Yet So Far: The Paradoxes of Mutual Recognition’, 14 Journal of European Public 
Policy 814 (2007).  
42 Oliary & Others v. Italy (21 July 2015), App. nos. 18766/11 & 36030/11.  
43 Ibid, para. 65. The US Supreme Court gave its judgement in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US_(2015) on 26 June 2015, i.e. 
slightly more than a month before Oliari. The European Court of Human Rights discusses that American case in 
impressive detail.   
44 Oliari, para. 54.  
45 S. Kirchgaessner, Italian Senate Passes Watered-Down Bill Recognizing Same-Sex Unions, Guardian, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/feb/25/italy-passes-watered-down-bill-recognising-same-sex-civil-unions (25 
February 2015).  
46 The ECJ has a rich history of articulating EU legal terminology, e.g., “worker” or “the court or tribunal of the Member 
States,” much broader than the national definitions available in the legal systems of the Member States.  
47 The latest addition to the fine-tuning of mutual recognition is the clarity with which the ECJ spelled out the obligation, 
lying on the Member States not to check the presumption that their peers adhere to fundamental rights: Opinion 2/13, 
para. 252. For a critical analysis, see, D Kochenov, ‘The Missing EU Rule of Law’, in C Closa & D Kochenov (eds), 
Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2016). 
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Kreimer’s third principle, limiting the territorial jurisdictions of the Member States. This is so, since a 
number of EU citizens who exercised their rights to move to another Member State can be better off in 
their new Member State of residence because the law of the first Member State would still apply to 
them.48  Such situations, when mandated by Union law would be outside the realm of private law: the 
functioning of the “entry option” is a direct consequence of the way that Union law functions vis-à-vis 
national law of the Member States. Such entry option is the emanation of the specific nature of 
European federalism. 
As will be further exemplified with the Citizenship Directive 2004/38/EC, if a same-sex married 
couple moves to a Member State where same sex marriage is still unrecognized, that latter Member 
State will be obliged to anyhow treat them as a married couple. Indeed, the language of the Directive 
does not contain any references to “one man – one woman”.49 In line with the recent U.S. Supreme 
Court pattern of reasoning on the rights recognized in another state,50 this strategy of activating EU 
law in litigation could in a long perspective spill over the recognition of various forms of legal unions 
for lesbian and gay couples all over the Union.  
EU law is then double-empowering: those who escape the sub-standard law of their own Member 
State, which does not respond to the needs of their life, enjoy additional protection having moved (and 
also upon return home, following the Singh principle).51 Those who move to the Member States whose 
political choices do not suit them well, are empowered to bring the law of their Member State of origin 
with them via mutual recognition, thus escaping the local regulation in the new Member State of 
residence. In both cases EU law serves as a vehicle to shield citizens from the legitimate democratic 
outcomes in their jurisdiction of residence, protecting them from the localized majoritarian perceptions 
of morality and acceptability.52 This double empowerment unquestionably implies a subtle (and 
sometimes not so subtle) pressure on the Member States democracies, thus improving their operation 
in the interests of all the strata of society through welcoming an additional avenue of Socratic 
contestation.53   
Bumpy road for gay rights in the Union: Genesis, evolution and current state of art 
Since the initial Treaty of Rome, the legal constructs of sex have experienced an impressive 
proliferation, despite the fact that the primary integration process was essentially driven by pure 
commercial rationales. A tiny and fairly toothless provision in Article 119 EEC (now Article 157 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU))54 introduced the seminal wording of 
gender equality between men and women, the equal pay principle. Few scholars could have imagined 
in the 1950s that this brief provision would pave the way to the far-reaching and evolving set of sexual 
rights in EU law. All the principal EU institutions (the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Council, 
the Commission and the Parliament) have been involved at various times and to varying degrees in the 
                                                       
48 Such situations can be criticised as undermining the principle of equality among European citizens. See, e.g., G.T. Davies, 
‘Services, Citizenship and the Country of Origin Principle’, Europa Institute: Mitchell Working Paper Series 2 (2007); A. 
Tryfonidou, Reverse Discrimination in EU Law (Kluwer, 2009), 43; D. Kochenov, ‘Citizenship Without Respect: The 
EU’s Troubled Equality Ideal’, 8 NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper (2010). 
49 But see A. Tryfonidou, ‘Free Movement Law and the Cross-Border Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: The 
Case for Mutual Recognition’, 21 Columbia Journal of European Law (2015) (who argues that the Directive could be 
reworded to be even clearer on the meaning of the “spouse”). 
50 See the aforementioned case of Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), 576_U.S. 
51 Case C-370/90, Singh [1992].  
52 A. Somek, ‘Europe: Political, Not Cosmopolitan’, 20 European Law Journal 142 (2014). 
53 M. Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification’, 4 Law and Ethics of Human Rights (2010), 
142. 
54 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2012 No. C326/47 (TFEU). 
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issues of gender mainstreaming, women’s labour and social rights, pregnancy and positive 
discrimination, gay liberation and sexual identity, prostitution, pornography and the fight against 
paedophilia and sexual trafficking.55 
Perhaps the culmination of gender rights (drawn out of the tiny gender-equality clause) was the ECJ’s 
rulings on transsexuals. In its 1996 judgement in P. v. S.,56 the Court interpreted the provision on the 
equality of men and women to apply to cases of gender reassignment.57 The EU has, therefore, broken 
with the idea of exclusively biologically-born women being the timid and delicate subjects of 
patriarchal familial relations, whose main purpose is the procreation of community and, ultimately, of 
the mythical nation. 
While early national citizenship systematically shut women out, it was also excluding gays unless they 
kept their identity hidden.58 As nationalist rhetoric on citizenship used to position women as subjects 
of procreation, non-heterosexual individuals were conceived as ‘pathological’, ‘immoral’ and ‘foreign’ 
to imagined domestic communities.59 Duties parlance was classically used to justify exclusion: not 
good enough to fight – not good enough to reap the fruits of citizenship.60 This particularly cynical 
way of construing citizenship rights is now passé.61 
Quite characteristically, the homophobic narrative in the new Member States of the Union, for 
example, is often framed as an ‘imposition of hostile Western values’ on blissfully prudish and moral 
‘national citizens’.62 The parallel discourse on the imagined pathology of homosexuality (a concept 
largely shaped by psychiatrists and criminologists)63 gained sustenance from the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.64 In this respect, there is a gap between the current Union Member States who found 
                                                       
55 U. Belavusau, ‘Sex in the Union: EU Law, Taxation and the Adult Industry’, 4 European Law Reporter 144 (2010). 
56 Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, EU:C:1996:170, [1996] ECR I-2143. Another pertinent case in this 
context is Case C-117/01, K. B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health, 
EU:C:2004:7, [2004] ECR I-541. 
57 Discrimination of transsexuals since then has been treated as an aspect of gender equality, as incorporated into Directive 
2006/54/EC on equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, OJ 
2006 No. L204/23, Rec. 3 of the Preamble: ‘The Court of Justice has held that the scope of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women cannot be confined to the prohibition of discrimination based on the fact that a person is of 
one or other sex. In view of its purpose and the nature of the rights which it seeks to safeguard, it also applies to 
discrimination arising from the gender reassignment of a person’. In June 2010, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution (the ‘Figueiredo report’) calling for an inclusive EU gender equality strategy, specifically addressing issues 
linked to gender identity: European Parliament, ‘Report on the assessment of the results of the 2006–2010 Roadmap for 
Equality between women and men, and forward-looking recommendations’, 2009/2242(INI) (Committee on Women’s 
Rights and Gender Equality, Rapporteur: Ilda Figueiredo, 12 May 2010).  
58 Obviously, this statement is subject to a disclaimer about the liquidity of the concept of homosexuality, as introduced not 
earlier than the 19th century. Ancient Greek citizenship, in contrast, fostered an alternative view on sexuality and the role 
of man-to-man relations which could hardly be regarded as discriminatory in contemporary terms. See D. Cohen, Law, 
Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
59 J. Nagel, Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality: Intimate Intersections, Forbidden Frontiers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003).  
60 D. Kochenov, ‘EU Citizenship without Duties’, 20 European Law Journal 482 (2014). 
61 But see R. Bellamy, ‘A Duty-Free Europe? What’s Wrong with Kochenov’s Account of EU Citizenship Rights’, Europeal 
Law Journal (2015). 
62 See e.g., K. Kahlina, ‘Contested Terrain of Sexual Citizenship: EU Accession and the Changing Position of Sexual 
Minorities in the Post-Yugoslav Context’ (2013) University of Edinburgh Working Paper No. 2013/33. 
63 See the classic work of Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1976). See also D. F. Greenberg, The 
Construction of Homosexuality (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1990). 
64 In this regard, see the recent ECJ Case on blood donation by men who have sex with men, C-528/13 Léger [2015], echoing 
the most outdated perceptions of homosexuality as a health-threatening issue. For a commentry, see U. Belavusau & I. 
Isailović, ‘Gay Blood: Bad Blood? A Brief Analysis of Léger Case [2015] C-528/13’, European Law Blog (26 August 
2015): www.europeanlawblog.eu.  
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themselves behind opposite sides of the Berlin Wall. Western countries had brought homosexuality 
into the vocabulary of active citizenship earlier, during sexual revolution of the 1960s and the AIDS 
breakout in the 1980s. Dennis Altman predicted that economic growth and development would 
facilitate the integration of homosexuals into modern society.65 Homosexuals do not map to any 
particular economic class and are therefore not easily reducible to an economically disadvantaged 
group. Nonetheless, economic development and globalisation are incompatible with exclusion based 
on sexual orientation.66 Likewise, the EU project based on the internal market rationale is hardly 
compatible with discrimination on the basis of sexuality, as it could exclude large sections of the 
population from providing and receiving services, consuming goods and fostering economic growth 
on an inter-state basis.  
As has been shown above, the ECJ has stretched the tiny sex equality clause to cover cases on gender 
reassignment and to protect the rights of transsexuals. However, it was the absolute maximum the 
Court was able to achieve to foster emancipation causes for LGBT individuals in the 1990s.67 Similar 
cases for gay and lesbian couples based on Article 157 TFEU have all failed.68 The heteronormativity 
of the EU legal order is additionally sustained by the de jure exclusion – often wrongly relied upon – 
of family matters from the scope of EU regulation, although it would have been perhaps more correct 
to state that currently, national and EU law co-regulate family matters to a certain degree.69 The ECJ 
has not had a chance to demand either absolute mutual recognition or clarify the meaning of a ‘spouse’ 
under the Directive 2004/38 – the two options open for changing the current practice of national-level 
non-compliance in a number of Member States outlined above in detail. The 1996 case on transsexuals 
was already a huge achievement, considering that back in the 1950s (when the EEC was established), 
judges all over Europe (including the European Court of Human Rights) employed the language of 
crime, pathology and deviation when describing homosexuality.70 Furthermore, it remained 
                                                       
65 D. Altman, The Homosexualization of America: the Americanization of the Homosexual (New York, NY: St Martin’s 
Press, 1982).  
66 R. A. Posner, Sex and Reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
67 K. Waaldijk and M. Bonini-Baraldi, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the European Union: National Laws and the 
Employment Equality Directive (The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press, 2006); G. N. von Toggenburg, ‘“LGBT” Go 
Luxembourg: On the Stance of Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender Rights Before the European Court of Justice’ 
European Law Reporter (2008) 174.  
68 Case 249/96, Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., EU:C:1998:63, [1998] ECR I-621; Case 122/99, D. and 
Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Union, EU:C:2001, [2001] ECR I-4319; Case 117/01, K.B. v. National 
Health Service Pensions Agency and Secretary of State for Health, EU:C:2004, [2004] ECR I-541. About the defeat of 
the earlier cases, see N. J. Beger, ‘Queer Readings of Europe: Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation and the (Im)potence of 
Rights Politics at the European Court of Justice’ (2000) 9 Social & Legal Studies 249. For a convincing argument that 
there is no logical reason to distinguish sex discrimination from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, see A. 
Koppelman, ‘The Miscegenation Analogy in Europe, or, Lisa Grant Meets Adolph Hitler’, in R. Wintermute & M. 
Andenaes (eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law 
(Oxford: Hart, 2001)  
69 As will be demonstrated below in the context of the ‘Citizenship Directive’ and the case law of the ECJ, it is quite wrong 
to keep assuming that EU law does not regulate family matters. For a convincing rebuttal of this erroneous claim, see H. 
Stalford, ‘For Better, For Worse: The Relationship between the EU Citizenship and the Development of Cross-Border 
Family Law’, in M. Dougan, N. Nic Shuibhne and E. Spaventa (eds.), Empowerment and Disempowerment of European 
Citizens (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), p. 223. The idea that family matters are completely excluded from EU 
regulation is often drawn from Rec. 22 of the Preamble to Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ 2000 No. L303/16, as well as 
from the ECJ cases, like the recent Case C-147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, EU:C:2011:286, 
[2011] ECR I-3591, para. 38: ‘As a preliminary point, it should be observed that, as EU law stands at present, legislation 
on the marital status of persons falls within the competence of the Member States’.   
70 M. Grigolo, ‘Sexualities and the ECHR: Introducing the Universal Sexual Legal Subject’ (2003) 14 European Journal of 
International Law 1023. 
Uladzislau Belavusau and Dimitry Kochenov 
10 
criminalised in many Member States until the 1970s, with Romania becoming the last EU Member 
State to decriminalise homosexuality in the 2000s (before its accession to the EU).71   
The perceived limitations on EU action written into primary law (the ECJ simply refused to follow 
other jurisdictions around the world, including the UN Human Rights Committee,72 in refusing to 
approach sexual orientation discrimination as sex discrimination) prompted the inclusion of a 
provision on anti-discrimination which would be self-standing and extend the emancipation potential 
beyond the ever-expanded yet proclaimed finite gender equality clause. Such a provision was 
negotiated into the Treaty of Amsterdam, which introduced Article 13 into the EC Treaty (today 
Article 19 TFEU). The new clause stands apart from the gender clause (the latter has acquired a richer 
harmonisation scope) and lists sexual orientation among the additional grounds of prohibited 
discrimination (along with race and ethnicity, age, disability and religion). The clause does not 
straightforwardly impose, for example, the necessity of full legal recognition of same-sex marriages, 
but it enables EU harmonisation powers to challenge discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
Although not without caveats, Article 19 TFEU has already contributed to the rise of EU secondary 
law protecting LGBT rights in the employment context,73 with important judgments in this field.74 
Furthermore, Article 19 TFEU was inserted into the second part of the TFEU, entitled ‘Non-
Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union’,75 thus consolidating the project of EU citizenship with 
the anti-discrimination ethos. The biggest achievement of the litigation based on secondary law 
adopted under Art. 19 TFEU so far has been the recognition of equal pay rights in various labour 
contexts (earlier acknowledged for women and transsexuals) for lesbian and gay couples, as soon as a 
state introduces a minimum legal status for the homosexual union (be it a partnership or a marriage).76  
In addition to Article 19 TFEU and a brief non-discrimination provision in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights,77 the next substantial EU basis for claiming gay rights is based on the so-called Citizenship 
Directive.78 This instrument of secondary EU law employs a gender-neutral language for family 
                                                       
71 For multiple (including Romanian) examples, see D. Kochenov, ‘Democracy and Human Rights – Not for Gay People?: 
EU Eastern Enlargement and Its Impact on the Protection of the Rights of Sexual Minorities’ (2007) 13 Texas Wesleyan 
Law Review 459. See also U. Belavusau, ‘A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-Discrimination Law’ (2015) 21 
Columbia Journal of European Law 353. 
72 E.g. Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994); Young v Australia, 
Merits, Communication No 941/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000, (2003) 5 IHRR 747, IHRL 1921 (UNHRC 
2003), 6th August 2003, Human Rights Committee [UNHRC]. 
73 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ 
2000 No. L303/16.  
74 Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungstanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, EU:C:2008:179, [2008] ECR I-1757.  
75 Arts 20–24 TFEU. 
76 See Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens’, note 35 above; M. Möschel, ‘Life Partnerships in Germany: Separate and 
Unequal?’ (2009) 16 Columbia Journal of European Law 37; D. Borillo, ‘Pluralisme conjugal ou hiérarchie des 
sexualiatés. La reconnaissance juridique des couples homosexuelles dans l’Union européenne’ (2011) 46 McGill Law 
Review 875.  
77 Art. 21 of the CFR stipulates a general prohibition of discrimination, based on sexual orientation. Its Arts. 7 (respect for 
private and family life) and 9 (right to marry and right to found a family) both employ gender-neutral language for 
‘family’, unlike some outdated national constitutions specifying that family is a union of a man and a woman, e.g. the 
current interpretation of Art. 6 in the German Grundgesetz. For discussion, see A. Sanders, ‘Marriage, Same-Sex 
Partnership, and the German Constitution’ (2012) 13 German Law Journal 911.   
78 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 
75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, OJ 2004 No. L158/77. 
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unions and partners.79 The Directive establishes several regimes for married, registered and 
unregistered partners. If a same-sex couple is married in a home state then EU law unquestionably 
requires the host state to recognise the marriage, as the wording of the Directive is crystal-clear.80 In 
other words, mutual recognition has to do its job – no ECJ intervention at the level of definitions is 
required. In practice, host states not recognising same-sex marriages often obstruct the practical 
enjoyment of the right of a spouse to join their partner – an issue which no doubt needs to be clarified 
in the case law of the ECJ. Given that if not asked what the law is, the ECJ will not tell – the eternal 
logic of Article 267 TFEU – activist litigation here is absolutely indispensable. 
Two situations are possible in the case of a registered partnership. Should the host Member State treat 
registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage, an individual then has the right to join their partner 
as if they were spouses. If the host state does not treat registered partnerships as equal to marriage, 
then the couple falls into the category of unregistered partners in a ‘durable relationship’. However, 
EU law creates no obligation to recognise registered partnerships. Unregistered partners do not enjoy 
the same right as a spouse to join their partner. Instead, the Directive obliges Member States to 
‘facilitate entry and residence’ to unregistered partners who are in a ‘durable relationship’. This 
unclear rule applies equally to same-sex couples and to couples of the opposite sex.81 Such situations 
cover same-sex couples where one is a EU citizen. In addition, the Family Reunification Directive 
allows spouses who are third-country nationals to be united with third-country nationals residing 
lawfully in the territory of a Member State. However, Member States are not explicitly obliged to 
extend this right to same-sex registered (or unregistered) partnerships.82 The evident limitation is that 
an albeit ever-decreasing number of EU countries continue not to recognise any form of same-sex 
unions. Furthermore, Poland and the UK negotiated a specific Protocol to the Charter which has been 
presented as opt-out of these countries from substantial parts of the Charter.83 Yet UK’s position – 
unlike Polish – was not motivated by the concerns about sexual liberalization. In fact, the UK has till 
now recognized both same sex partnerships and marriages.84 Poland, in contrast, has adopted a specific 
declaration on morality and family law.85 In practice, this acclaimed opt-out from the Charter is 
meaningless: technically non-discrimination matters can always be handled by reference to Article 19 
TFEU, the general principle of equality and fundamental rights.86      
The federal elements embedded in the ever-evolving EU law discussed above, created mobilising 
opportunities for transnational LGBT litigation and, on the other hand, have steadily Europeanised the 
                                                       
79 Art. 2(2) Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union, OJ 2004 No. L158/77 states: ‘“family member” means the 
spouse’. Rec. 3 of the Preamble to the Directive is even more explicit: ‘Member States should implement this Directive 
without discrimination between the beneficiaries of this Directive on grounds such as […] sexual orientation.’  
80 Kochenov, ‘On Options of Citizens’, note 35 above. 
81 For a broad discussion of the Directive with regard to same-sex couples, see M. Bell, EU Directive on Free Movement and 
Same-Sex Families: Guidelines on the Implementation Process (ILGA-Europe Report, 2005). For a summary, see Same-
Sex Couples, Free Movement of EU Citizens, Migration and Asylum (European Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009). 
For a recent academic study, see A. Tryfonidou, ‘Free Movement Law and the Cross-Border Legal Recognition of Same-
Sex Relationships: The Case for Mutual Recognition’, 21 Columbia Journal of European Law (2015). 
82 Wider aspects of residence are regulated in Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, OJ 2003 No. L251/12.   
83 Protocol 30 on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United 
Kingdom 2007, OJ 2012 No. C326/313. 
84 Respectively, same-sex partnership from 2004 and marriages from 2013.  
85 Declaration No. 61 by the Republic of Poland on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2012 No. 
C326/360: ‘The Charter does not affect in any way the right of Member States to legislate in the sphere of public 
morality, family law, as well as the protection of human dignity and respect for human physical and moral integrity’. 
86 C. Barnard, ‘The “Opt-Out” for the UK and Poland from the Charter of Fundamental Rights: Triumph of Rhetoric over 
Reading’, in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds.), Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? 
(Vienna: Springer, 2008). 
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discourse on gay rights as part-and-parcel of Union values. EU citizenship, non-discrimination and 
fundamental rights’ developments have all contributed to the minimum ‘European’ standards of sexual 
rights. The ultimate question is whether we face the nascent ‘right to love’ translated into conservative 
states through the vertical distribution of EU law. With this overwhelming EU federalisation, the 
discourse on LGBT rights can no longer be silenced in the moralistic socio-political narratives of the 
Union’s homophobic elites prevalent in some Member States. As has been demonstrated in recent 
studies, the ‘Europeanization of LGBT rights begins primarily as a vertical process in which the EU 
imposes formal rules on Member States and builds the capacities of civil society [...] to lobby 
domestic institutions. This engenders new domestic discourses and generates media attention around 
the LGBT issue, which domestic groups then use to draw attention from outside’.87 Yet the borders of 
the homo-space (an indispensable aspect of EU sexual citizenship)88 are continuously being negotiated 
with the ‘public universal’ hetero-counterpart. In this respect, fairly progressive EU sexual rights also 
shape new categories of homo and hetero that are themselves based on an act of copy-paste from the 
heterosexual family relations. However, the current scope of protection incorporated into the primary 
law and the neutral language of family ‘partners’ in the Citizenship Directive both leave the Union 
with an open project for sexual rights, which could further accommodate less typical (beyond 
heteronormative and patriarchal) forms of intimacy – including networks of friends, lovers and 
partners – as spaces for socialisation.89 A relationship is no longer a procreative prerequisite of the 
‘good citizenship’ but an end in itself, developing into the right to love.  
EU litigation box for Central and Eastern Europe: Example of ACCEPT 
At the vertical level, EU sexual citizenship distributes sexual rights to Member States through several 
channels. Before accession, future Member States are obliged to adopt governance of sexual rights 
through the Copenhagen criteria on the rule of law and fundamental rights (that is, for example, to 
decriminalise adult same-sex relations). After accession, EU institutions contribute to the minimum 
level of emancipation of sexual standards across Member States (for example, non-discrimination in 
employment and asylum). Furthermore, the EU offers a litigation space for active citizens and social 
movements to advance their sexual causes at the Court of Justice, while remedies belong to the realm 
of national courts where concerned individuals and organization exercise their legal standing also with 
regard to EU law. The ECJ has bolstered the proliferation of gender equality and took a moral-neutral 
position to adjudications on sexual services. Finally, sexual rights find their way vertically to Member 
States through the federal discourse of EU citizenship. The rhetoric of gender and sexual emancipation 
is strongly associated with idealistic perceptions of European politics and law. EU federalisation 
fosters the social imagination of EU citizens and social movements who, in turn, rely on EU sexual 
standards as a strategy for humiliating Member States. European becomes the language of rights and 
entitlements. EU sexual citizenship, thus, turns into a realm for disciplining embarrassment in the 
Union. Dictating gender roles, sexual choices and lifestyles is not yet fully precluded. Yet thanks to 
the EU, it is finally a cause for shame and yields less cash. 
                                                       
87 P. M. Ayoub, ‘Cooperative Transnationalism in Contemporary Europe: Europeanization and Political Opportunities for 
LGBT Mobilization in the European Union’ (2013) 5 European Political Science Review 280. 
88 U. Belavusau, ‘EU Sexual Citizenship: Sex Beyond the Internal Market’, in D Kochenov (ed.), EU Citizenship and 
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One recent case from Luxembourg which stands out from the rest as particularly promising in 
litigation terms is the judgment in Asociaţia ACCEPT.90 This case, which put homophobia under the 
spotlight of EU law, illustrates the value of pragmatic cause litigation (similar to the Defrenne saga in 
the 1970s) for the benefit of a disempowered minority and the rise of an active form of citizenship 
mobilising EU sexual rights. A Romanian football club was found to be performing direct 
discrimination by not distancing itself from the words of its patron. The patron announced that he 
would never hire a gay player. A non-discrimination organisation managed to bring this case in the 
absence of a single plaintiff. The locus standi for organisations is undoubtedly a huge achievement of 
EU non-discrimination law in that it encourages the litigious potential of active citizenship.91 It will be 
fair to say that Romanian legislation was even broader in empowering organizations to bring cases 
than what is provided in Art. 9 (2) of the Framework Directive. This tactic, based on civil litigants and 
social movements, gives a true boost to otherwise ‘desperate’ cases, which lack individual plaintiffs. 
The latter factor is particularly emblematic for the LGBT community, especially in Member States 
with more socially prevalent homophobia and religious obscurantism. In such societies, where coming 
out is still uncommon, revealing alternative sexuality often leads to social ostracism and numerous 
employment difficulties. As convincingly demonstrated by Foucault, heteronormativity is not 
exclusively a matter of repression.92 Instead, it is often sustained by keeping the sexual as a most 
cherished secret of Western society. The ‘closet’ (that is, the concealment of sexuality) serves as an 
asylum for many gays and lesbians. Hence, a deafening and embarrassing silence remain the stigma of 
the queer citizens.  
These scenarios for strategic litigation by either a strong and genuinely independent equality body or 
by an autonomous human rights organization essentially revolutionizes perspectives for future 
development of non-discrimination law in Europe. They give a veritable boost to otherwise 
“desperate” cases with no individual plaintiffs available. There are a number of factors in various 
segments of non-discrimination protection preventing individual plaintiffs from  launching a case, 
including inter alia:  
• Low awareness about legal possibilities to seek judicial redress, frequently combined with 
imperfect knowledge of the official language of procedures (very often affecting migrants);  
• Serious physical or mental handicaps (in the case of disabled people);  
• Age of affected victims (in the cases of both youngsters and elderly people);  
• Religious considerations and subordinated status (e.g., women in some traditional Islamic 
families);  
• A fear of public disgrace and considerations of privacy, etc.   
Various fact-finding missions initiated by ACCEPT indicate that LGBT persons are commonly 
intimidated and harassed by police forces. Under the threat of getting outed, victims pay bribes and 
rarely initiate legal action.93 It is therefore ever important to promote this tool of cause lawyering94 by 
                                                       
90 Case C-81/12, Asociaţia ACCEPT v. Consiliul Naţional pentru Combaterea Discriminării, EU:C:2013:275. For an 
extensive comment on the case, see U. Belavusau, ‘A Penalty Card for Homophobia from EU Non-Discrimination Law’ 
(2015) 21 (2) Columbia Journal of European Law 353.   
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92 See P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 294.  
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altruism, empathy, self-interest, mixed motives, such lawyers advocate for a social cause rather than for a corporate 
interest or protection of individual concerns. For various accounts, see A. Sarat & S. Scheingold (eds.), Cause 
Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). In the 
Uladzislau Belavusau and Dimitry Kochenov 
14 
both the equality bodies (in the sense, of the equality Directives) and independent NGOs, in addition 
to the traditional focus on individual plaintiffs. This new wave of strategic litigation may yield its 
precious fruits for the mobilization of social movements representing protected minorities.95 The 
litigation track of ACCEPT (essentially actio popularis) creates a new legal opportunity for gay and 
lesbian organizations in Luxembourg after their substantial defeat in the “gay cases” in the 1990s-
2000s.96 The initial political opportunity in the Member States and EU level – where gay organizations 
started their lobbying not earlier than in the 1990s, compared to the feminist organizations effectively 
exploring both legal and political EU opportunities97 – was equally low.98 Enabled with sufficient 
financial and information resources (a task which should be duly understood as an objective of EU 
investments), this focus on social movements is capable of strengthening equal opportunities in 
Europe under the double vigilance of EU institutions and civil society.99  
Right to love as the proper framework for analysis 
Given the political climate in some Member States, as well as anti-gay public opinion, it is clear that 
once the entry option for the gay families coupled with a more effective deployment of Article 19 
TFEU principles, begins to function as it should within the European Union, the less-liberal Member 
States will do their best to block the application of free movement to gay citizens’ family members. 
Different exceptions are likely to be invoked in order to justify discrimination. A similar situation 
occurred in the aforementioned American case, with a gay couple legally married in Maryland seeking 
recognition of rights derived from their marriage in Ohio. Expectedly, Ohian authorities did their best 
to prevent such a recognition. At which point, the cause laywers used this legal opportunity to foster 
equality in the U.S. Supreme Court.100  
As far as potential morality exceptions are concerned, Karst’s logic can be employed in the analysis of 
their potential reach. In his fundamental essay on the Freedom of Intimate Association, Karst defended 
a point that “freedom does not imply that the state is wholly disabled from promoting majoritarian 
views of morality. What the freedom does demand is a serious search for justifications by the state for 
any significant impairment of values of intimate association.”101  In other words, “we must search for a 
state interest of very great importance.”102  The states should not only be allowed to hide behind the 
screen of “morality,” serious justifications for any limitation need to be provided.  Once stricter 
(Contd.)                                                                    
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scrutiny in such a context becomes a dominating standard, the states will start losing overwhelmingly 
and systematically, as the majority of anti-gay policies are essentially entirely deprived of any sense 
and largely aim at the perpetuation of prejudice,103 being “the product of folklore and fantasy rather 
then evidence of real risk of harm.”104  The potential dangers of such new standard for the states’ 
ability to regulate marriage are evident.105 Restricting marriage and non-marital intimate association 
will be extremely difficult, which is a good thing, as “where marriage is involved the state does not 
have a contracting party’s choice to accept or reject a compact.”106 
There is no room, in the European legal context, for the imposition of Karst’s vision on the Member 
States willing to suppress certain forms of intimate association at the national level following the 
perceived interests of the majority of their citizens.  However, the Union can apply Karst’s reasoning 
when the law of such a Member State is forming an obstacle for a couple exercising free movement 
rights in the EU, i.e., once the operability of the entry option is at stake. In a situation when the 
achievement of the goals of the EU Treaties is threatened, the strictest scrutiny is to be required. 
Unlike in the free movement of goods,107 public morality is not included among the Treaty grounds on 
which a Member State willing to justify a restriction can rely. While Article 21 (1) allows for 
“limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by measures adopted to give it effect”108 the 
most commonly used lex specialis instrument, Article 45 (3) only includes “public policy, public 
security and public health”109 among the possible grounds.  It seems that deviating using these 
exceptions in order to justify non-recognition of same-sex partnerships or marriages is virtually 
impossible, since, in the situation when the usability of health and security arguments can be 
dismissed right away, public policy cannot possibly consist in discriminating on the basis of sex.110  
While it is ultimately up to the Court to establish the possible extent of exceptions from the application 
of the entry option, the text of the relevant provisions as well as the position usually taken by the Court 
in the cases involving deviations from the main Treaty rule make it clear that any exceptions are to be 
interpreted restrictively and do not entitle the Member States to discriminate.  This means that Union 
law is unlikely to be of assistance for any Member State in CEE seeking exceptions from general 
application of the law of free movement of persons in order to respect the homophobic opinion of the 
majority.111 
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Conclusions 
EU citizenship provides vertical opportunities for claiming sexual rights, in addition to horizontal 
developments occurring in certain Member States.112 The federal structure of the EU boasting unique 
exit and entry options unquestionably broadens the horizon of rights enjoyed by minority 
communities. Moreover, the current multilevel system of fundamental rights protection in Europe 
(EU, Council of Europe, national states and a relatively vast number of actors such as the media and 
NGOs) equally boosts political opportunities for advocacy groups to mobilise around the social issues 
of gender and sexual equality. As studies by political scientists demonstrate, such groups continuously 
frame their demands as a matter of ‘European’ discourse by making issues of equality and acceptance 
one of human rights and domestic responsibilities of the EU community.113  
The ultimate question is whether we are observing a nascent ‘right to love’ distributed through the EU 
citizenship discourse into the less-fortunate states via the federalising impact of EU law. While the 
presence of an exit option is indisputably inherent to the nature of virtually any federal system, the 
legal specificity of the supranational community in Europe, with its goal-oriented reading of 
competences and the growing awareness of the possible implications of its actions for human rights 
protection potentially opens a way also to an ‘entry option’ that would oblige Member States to 
recognise less restrictive or simply different moral choices made by other states.  
This paper has demonstrated that outside the ideologically charged areas of sexuality, gender identity 
and family law, such an ‘entry option’ is already a day-to-day reality in the EU. The careful analysis of 
the EU harmonization developments in primary and secondary law, as well as of the case law of the 
Court of Justice through the looking glass of Kreimer’s ‘federalism’ and Karst’s ‘freedom of intimate 
association’, reveal multiple opportunities for mobilising EU law as a strong shield against 
homophobia, in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. In this regard, the recent judgement of the 
US Supreme Court in Obergegell v. Hodges (2015) supplies a valuable example of a ‘federalist’ 
litigation track for the EU. In the future, European LGBT movements will have to further capitalize on 
the available yet not entirely explored paradigm of EU citizenship – with its entry and exist options for 
mobile couples – as well as on the actio popularis litigation schemes innovatively embedded in EU 
anti-discrimination law.  
 
 
 
 
                                                       
112 K. Alter and J. Vargas, ‘Explaining Variation in the Use of European Litigation Strategies: European Community Law 
and British Gender Equality Policy’ (2000) 33 Comparative Political Studies 452. In citizenship studies ‘vertical’ is 
sometimes understood as relationship between citizen and state, while ‘horizontal’ absorbs relationship among citizens 
developing a community with shared loyalties and character. For the purposes of this paper, ‘vertical opportunities’ refer 
to EU claims while ‘horizontal opportunities’ describe cause lawyering based on national legal system(s).  
113 R. A. Cichowski, ‘Legal Mobilization, Transnational Activism and Gender Equality in the EU’ (2013) 28 Canadian 
Journal of Law & Society 209; P. M. Ayoub, ‘Cooperative Transnationalism in Contemporary Europe: Europeanization 
and Political Opportunities for LGBT Mobilization in the European Union’ (2013) 5 European Political Science Review 
279; K. Zippel, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks and Policy Cycles in the European Union: The Case of Sexual 
Harassment’ (2004) 11 Social Politics 57; L.R. Heffer & E. Voeten, ‘International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: 
Evidence from LGBTQ Persons in Europe’ (2014) 68 International Organizations 77. 
  
 
